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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DAUBERT AND THE STATES:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EMERGING TRENDS

I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion for the Supreme Court of the
United States in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in 1993.1 This
case attempted to settle the controversy surrounding the qualification of
scientific evidence in federal courts.2 Prior to the Court’s decision in Daubert,
many state courts had adopted the “general acceptance” test promulgated by
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.3 The application of this
standard became questionable after the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence
702 (hereinafter “Rule 702”)—the Rule governing the admissibility of expert
testimony—which did not contain any reference to Frye or to the “general
acceptance” test.4 The debate concerning the continued efficacy of the
“general acceptance” test—or Frye test, as it is also called—was decisively

1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. Id. at 585. This decision was prompted, at least in part, by some enormous verdicts that
were arguably predicated on shoddy science. Another catalyst leading to this decision was the
rise of products liability litigation in the 1960s and 1970s. David G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert,
80 DENV. U. L. REV. 345, 351 (2002).
3. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585. Before Daubert, the Supreme Court and many other
jurisdictions applied the formulation set out in Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46 (D.C. Cir.
1923) when faced with the proffer of novel scientific evidence. In this citation-free opinion from
the D.C. Circuit, the court made the following observation:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. at 47 (emphasis added). Before the Court adopted Daubert, the alternative test to Frye was
the so-called “relevancy test.” For a brief discussion of this test see Andrew E. Taslitz, Daubert’s
Guide to the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Not-So-Plain-Meaning Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 3, 36–37 (1995).
4. The question of whether Rule 702 supplanted Frye was fueled, in part, by the fact that
the concept of “general acceptance” was not mentioned in the text of the rule or in the advisory
committee’s notes. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. This absence was quite
remarkable considering the widespread use of the “general acceptance” test.
177
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settled in Daubert. In Daubert, the Court expressly found that Frye was
superceded by Rule 702.5
This decision, at least on its face, has had a marked effect on the
qualification of scientific evidence in federal courts.6 It has also had a
significant effect on the qualification of scientific evidence in the state courts.
Though not binding on the states, the test set out in Daubert has been adopted
by more than twenty states.7 The Court’s rationale in Daubert has not attained
universal acceptance among the states, which is evidenced by the fact that as
many as half the states still apply Frye or some other test when determining the
admissibility of expert testimony.8 Regardless, this issue remains hotly
contested by litigants in state courts and has produced significant confusion at
trial, resulting in numerous decisions in state courts of last resort.9
Daubert and its progeny have left some state courts in an awkward
position. This situation resulted because many states have adopted the
provisions set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because many states
have adopted a rule similar to, if not identical to, Rule 702, it would seem that
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that Rule would be fairly persuasive.
However, some states, whose evidence codes or relevant evidentiary statutes

5. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (noting the “permissive backdrop” of the rules and the
“inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony” the Court found “general acceptance” to be
incompatible with Rule 702).
6. There is much debate over whether the Court’s ruling in Daubert actually changed the
way in which expert testimony is qualified. This doubt as to whether Daubert has actually
effected any substantive change in this process has led one scholar to refer to Daubert as merely
“Frye in drag.” Paul R. Rice, Peer Dialogue: The Quagmire of Scientific Testimony: Crumping
the Supreme Court’s Style, 68 MO. L. REV. 53, 62 (2003). But see Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath
of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 230–31
(2000) (arguing that Frye “ allowed judges to piggy-back their decisions onto someone else’s
judgment,” while Daubert “increases judges’ gatekeeping duty by requiring them to evaluate
claims of scientific expertise much as scientists would”).
7. See generally Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of
Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453 (2001). Those states that
have chosen to adopt Daubert or some similar test include Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nebraska,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. Those that continue to
apply Frye include Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
and Washington. Id. Alabama, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, and New
Jersey apply the Daubert factors but have not explicitly rejected Frye. Id. Georgia, Utah,
Virginia, and Wisconsin have developed their own tests. Id.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146
(Mo. 2003) (en banc).
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are almost identical to Rule 702, have rejected the Court’s interpretation of
Rule 702.10
The debate over which standard should apply to proffered scientific
evidence is not merely a matter of statutory interpretation; Daubert and Frye
reflect two fundamentally different conceptions of science and the ways in
which science should be used in the courtroom. Furthermore, the differences
between these two tests go beyond the mechanics of admissibility; specifically,
they represent differing views as to the role of judges and their capacity to
evaluate complex information.
A few important questions necessarily arise. The first is whether there is
any “practical” difference between the application of Daubert and the
application of Frye. If there is no practical difference, as some have argued,
then the choice of which procedure to use in determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence is of negligible importance. If, however, the test for
determining the admissibility of expert testimony is truly outcomedeterminative, then it is critical that courts adopt the test that best assures that
relevant and reliable information is not excluded from the purview of the trier
of fact. In order to assess the relative merits of Daubert and Frye, it is
important to possess a clear understanding of the ruling in Daubert and two of
its most well-known progeny. Additionally, criticism of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Daubert, which has been abundant, is also relevant to the states, in
that it may be helpful in guiding them toward a more consistent and workable
approach to the qualification of expert testimony. This Comment will set forth
a synopsis of the debate surrounding Daubert and Frye, which will provide the
foundation for an analysis of several different approaches taken by the states.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: An Evolution in Scientific
Jurisprudence?

In Daubert, petitioners attempted to introduce expert testimony concerning
the anti-nausea drug Bendectin, which was marketed by Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals.11 Plaintiffs’ experts were to give testimony, based upon
animal studies, that tended to show Bendectin caused cancer.12 The district
court found that the science underlying the proposed testimony did not meet

10. See infra Parts III.A.1, B.1–2.
11. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 583 (1993). Petitioners Jason
Daubert and Eric Schuller (both minor children) were born with serious birth defects. Id. at 582.
They argued that their birth defects were caused by their mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin, a drug
manufactured by defendant Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Id.
12. Id. at 583.
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the “general acceptance” test and held the testimony inadmissible.13 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.14 Because the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling evidenced a discrepancy among the circuits, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the issue presented with a
discussion of Rule 702.15 In holding that a rigid “general acceptance” test, i.e.,
Frye, was superceded by Rule 702, the Court found that a continued adherence
to Frye “would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and
their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to “opinion”
testimony.’”16 Because Frye was no longer the standard to be applied in the
federal courts, the Supreme Court formulated a new test based on Rule 702.17
Under Rule 702, the Supreme Court found that a trial judge should play the
role of gatekeeper with respect to scientific evidence.18 In this role, a trial
judge must determine that scientific evidence/testimony is both relevant and
reliable if it is to be admitted into evidence.19 To be admissible under the new
test, the subject of an expert’s testimony must be scientific knowledge that is
grounded “in the methods and procedures of science” and must consist of more
than “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”20 In other words, the
proffered testimony must be supported by “appropriate validation.”21 Another
requirement—stated expressly in Rule 702—is that proposed evidence must
“assist the trier of fact.”22 This consideration is primarily one of relevance,
such that the proffered evidence must be tied to the facts of the particular case;

13. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp 570, 573 (S.D. Cal 1989).
14. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
15. In the first sentence of the opinion Justice Blackmun stated that the question presented
was “to determine the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial.”
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582. It is important to realize that Daubert was a decision which, by its own
terms, was restricted to the admissibility of scientific testimony. This point merits consideration
because of the Court’s subsequent decisions, effectively subjecting all expert testimony to a
Daubert analysis. See infra notes 43–52 and accompanying text.
16. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. In holding that Frye was superceded by Rule 702, the Court
recognized that “general acceptance” was not an explicit requirement of the rule, that respondent
failed to present evidence that Rule 702 was intended to incorporate “general acceptance,” and
that Frye was not mentioned in the drafting history of the rule. Id.
17. For an interesting evaluation of the interpretative method of the Supreme Court with
particular emphasis on the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert, see Taslitz, supra note 3. In his
article, the author argues that the Court “purported to find plain meaning where none exists.” Id.
at 35.
18. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 589–90 (emphasis added). The Court’s discussion of “scientific knowledge”
mainly related to the reliability prong of the Court’s decision. Id.
21. Id. at 590.
22. Id. at 591 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). The second part of the Court’s analysis relates to
the relevance prong. Id.
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it is sometimes stated that the evidence must “fit” the facts of the case.23 In
order to resolve these two questions—whether an expert is testifying to
scientific knowledge, and whether that knowledge will assist the trier of fact—
the trial judge should determine, as a preliminary matter, whether the
methodology and principles animating the offered testimony are scientifically
valid.24
Facially, Daubert expands the trial judge’s role at trial by making it the
judge’s responsibility to determine whether an expert’s methodology and
principles are scientifically valid. Under the Frye test, this determination is not
for the judge. Additionally, Frye does not require a trial judge to determine
whether the methodology and principles underlying an expert’s testimony are
reliable.25 Nevertheless, the Daubert majority explicitly assigned this “new”
role to trial judges. In an effort to provide some guidance to the lower courts,
These observations
the Court offered “some general observations.”26
amounted to a set of non-exclusive factors that a judge should assess when
determining whether a theory or methodology is both valid and applicable to
the facts of a given case.27 A judge should consider whether a theory or
technique is capable of being or has been tested, whether it has been subjected
to peer review and publication, its known or potential rate of error when
applied, and whether it has gained general acceptance.28
23. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
24. Id. at 592–93 (expressing confidence that “federal judges possess the capacity to
undertake this review”). The issue of capacity is extremely important to the determination of the
appropriate standard for admissibility. It is often argued that judges, with no specific scientific
background, should not be invested with the duty of evaluating contradicting testimony given by
two or more qualified experts. The problems attending the dilemma of the “battle of the experts”
are central to the proper resolution of the qualification/admissibility debate. Surely, if federal
judges are qualified and able to “undertake this review,” state court judges should be entrusted
with this responsibility as well. An intriguing take on this issue is the approach of the courts in
Wisconsin where such determinations are to be made by the jury with the aid of crossexamination and impeachment. See infra Part III.A.3.
25. Under Frye, the judge hears the testimony of an expert who would testify to whether a
particular mode of reasoning or methodology was “generally accepted.” To put it simply, the
judge would defer to the judgment of one who was qualified to make such determinations. See
Saks, supra note 6, at 230–31 (2000). This is one of the most criticized aspects of the holding in
Daubert. The relegation of this duty to the trial judge is controversial because many claim that
the judge is, for all intents and purposes, a layperson. As such, it is argued that a trial judge is not
qualified to make this determination. See id.
26. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
27. Id. at 593. Importantly, the Court noted that “[m]any factors will bear on the inquiry”
such that one should not presume that the four factors presented by the Court were meant to be “a
definitive checklist or test.” Id. at 593. This language is important because some jurists and
others have interpreted Daubert as establishing a rigid framework for admissibility. See Judge
Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743 (1999).
28. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. The Court observed that “[t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule
702 is . . . a flexible one” and the “focus . . . must be solely on principles and methodology, not
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Joiner and Kumho Tire: A Step in the Right Direction, or Another Step
Back?

In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Supreme Court decided that a trial
court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under Daubert should be
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.29 This standard is equally
applicable without regard to the “outcome determinative” role that decisions
made pursuant to Daubert sometimes play.30 At first blush, there is nothing
especially remarkable about Joiner. However, when properly read, Joiner
stands for the principle that “the law grants a district court the same broad
latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to
its ultimate reliability determination.”31 Allowing a trial court to decide the
proper method for determining reliability gives that court broad discretion
when it conducts Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) hearings pursuant to
Daubert (sometimes referred to as Daubert hearings).32 The broad discretion
afforded trial judges in these matters is the cause of a fair amount of the
controversy on this issue. Presumably, a trial judge could choose to give more
weight to the general acceptance criterion than to the other factors established
by the Court, resulting in a system hardly distinguishable from Frye.
However, by the same token, a trial judge may play a more expansive role after
Joiner and Daubert and choose to evaluate any number of indicators that she
deems relevant to the case, resulting in increased activism on the bench.
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court held that the trial
court’s “gatekeeping obligation,” as set forth in Daubert, also applied to

on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at 594–95. Though the Court established the Daubert
factors as part of a flexible inquiry, some courts have applied these factors in a rigid manner. For
a critical analysis of Daubert’s misapplication in the 5th Circuit, see Thomas M. Reavley &
Daniel A. Petalas, Commentary, A Plea for Return to Evidence Rule 702, 77 TEX. L. REV. 493
(1998) (providing examples of strict applications of Daubert with the resulting effect of the
exclusion of expert testimony).
29. 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997). Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggests that the
Federal Rules allow more scientific testimony than would have been allowed under Frye. Id. at
142. This assertion flies in the face of those scholars who suggest that Daubert really did not
change Frye in any significant way. See Rice, supra note 6, at 62.
30. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143. It is clear the Court recognized that rulings on the admissibility
of expert testimony are outcome-determinative. The more interesting question is whether the
difference in the procedures for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence under
Daubert and Frye are outcome-determinative as well.
31. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999) (citing Joiner, 522 U.S. at
139). For a succinct criticism of the Court’s holding in Joiner see Saks, supra note 6, at 240–41
(arguing that the Court “needlessly abandoned Daubert’s useful distinction between methodology
and conclusions”).
32. For an illustrative analysis of what is actually involved in a Daubert hearing, see G.
Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29
CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 963–66 (1996).
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testimony based on technical and other types of specialized knowledge.33 In
Kumho, a case which resulted from an auto accident allegedly caused by a
defective tire, plaintiffs offered an expert in tire failure analysis who was to
give testimony based on his technical experience with tire blowouts.34 The
district court examined the expert’s methodology in light of the Daubert
factors, even though the expert’s testimony was most likely technical rather
than scientific.35 The district court found the expert’s testimony unreliable
based upon an application of the factors set forth in Daubert; as such, the
district court excluded the evidence and granted defendant’s summary
judgment motion.36 The Supreme Court found that the manner in which the
district court analyzed the expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion.37
In finding that Daubert’s “basic gatekeeping obligation” applies to all expert
testimony, the Court was mindful of the fact that the language of Rule 702
makes no relevant distinction between the various categories of expert
testimony.38
The Supreme Court went on to hold that a trial judge “may” consider the
specific factors set out in Daubert when determining the reliability of nonscientific expert testimony.39 Cognizant of Daubert’s instruction that the
inquiry under Rule 702—in keeping with the liberal thrust of the Rules—
should be flexible, the Court refused to determine if this inquiry should apply
in all cases, instead stressing that such an inquiry would be dependent on the
facts in a given case.40 The Court was clear in its assertion that some of the
Daubert factors could be helpful in evaluating the reliability of experiencebased expert testimony.41 The problem with the Court’s assertion of
helpfulness is that a substantial part of so-called “experienced-based

33. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141.
34. Id. at 142. Plaintiff’s expert, Dennis Carlson, Jr., concluded that the blowout was the
result of a defect in manufacture or design of the tire. The Court was dubious of this conclusion,
considering that the tire at issue was admittedly old and showed signs of two punctures that were
inadequately repaired. See id. at 143.
35. Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp 1514, 1521–22 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
36. Id. at 1522–23.
37. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142.
38. Id. at 147 (noting that it is “the Rule’s word ‘knowledge,’ not the words (like ‘scientific’)
that modify that word, that ‘establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability’”(quoting Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993))). The Court was concerned that it
would be difficult for a district court to “administer evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping
obligation depended upon a distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other
specialized’ knowledge.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 148.
39. Id. at 150.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 151.
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methodology” is not, by its very nature, subject to the kinds of analysis set
forth in Daubert.42
C. The 2000 Amendment to Rule 702
Rule 702 was amended in 2000 in response to Daubert, Kumho Tire, and
to a lesser extent Joiner.43 The 2000 amendment mandates that expert
testimony shall be admitted only “if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.”44 The advisory committee’s note makes clear that the
amendment “provides some general standards that the trial court must use to
assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert testimony.”45 Thus,
the amendments statutorily incorporate Kumho Tire’s application of Daubert to

42. See generally David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the
Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 68 MO. L. REV. 1 (2003). But see Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Peer Dialogue: The How and What of “Appropriate Validation” Under Daubert:
Reconsidering the Treatment of Einstein and Freud, 68 MO. L. REV. 43 (2003) (critiquing
Professor Crump’s treatment of Daubert-Kumho). In the first instance, Crump is critical of
Daubert because the majority’s attempt to define science was inappropriate within the confines of
Daubert and caused a dysfunctional result. Crump, supra, at 7. In this same vein, Crump is
critical of the Court’s decisions in both Daubert and Kuhmo because of the extent to which the
Court determined issues which were not before it. Id. at 11. However, regardless of Crump’s
argument, the Court makes clear that the trial judge has considerable leeway in determining
which of the factors, if any, to use in coming to a reliability determination. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S.
at 152.
43. FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000) advisory committee notes. The amendment became effective
December 1, 2000. Id. It seems rather ironic that Rule 702 was amended to reflect the Court’s
decisions in Daubert and Kumho Tire because these decisions were interpretations of the preamended rule.
44. FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000).
45. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee notes (emphasis added). The committee’s notes
also provide other factors that might be relevant—not exclusive or exhaustive—in determining
whether expert testimony is reliable including:
(1) Whether experts are “proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly
out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have
developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.”
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an
unfounded conclusion.
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations.
(4) Whether the expert “is being as careful as he would in his regular professional work,”
[not including other work as a paid expert].
(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results
for the type of opinion the expert would give.
Id. (citations omitted).
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all forms of expert testimony; however, it is important to note that “[n]o
attempt has been made to ‘codify’ [the] specific factors.”46
Some have claimed that the incorporation of Daubert-Kumho into the
Federal Rules of Evidence effectively crystallizes an already dysfunctional
rule. Scholars have argued that the Daubert framework is problematic when
confined to the analysis of scientific evidence.47 Without regard to Daubert’s
narrow conception of science, Crump argues that the guidelines set forth in
Daubert are not appropriate for the consideration of experience-based
testimony.48 If it is admitted that Daubert does indeed reflect a narrow
conception of science, the effect of such a formulation would vary greatly with
the particular stance a judge took as to her role in determining the admissibility
of expert testimony. If the Daubert factors are truly meant to be illustrative,
then a court need not evaluate evidence in light of those factors that do not
apply to a specific field or methodology. If, however, a judge interprets
Daubert in a stricter sense, or if other criteria for determining reliability are not
available, these fears could be realized.
D. Daubert and Frye: A Critical Analysis
The problem with Daubert is that it has been subject to varied
interpretations. One scholar observed that the dilemma of Daubert is that it “is
at the same time both more restrictive of expert evidence and less restrictive of
expert evidence.”49 Perhaps this confusion can be attributed to the different
ways that Frye has been applied. For example, before Daubert, some federal
judges took an activist stance in regard to the qualification of scientific
evidence and continued with this approach after the case as well.50 In contrast,
other judges operating under the “general acceptance” test merely determined
admissibility based upon the testimony of an expert who established the state
of a theory or methodology.51 However, some scholars have argued that
Daubert did little to change the standard for admissibility in federal courts and
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 42.
48. See id.
49. Fenner, supra note 32, at 953. The author argues that Daubert is less restrictive in the
sense that it allows evidence that definitely would not have been allowable under Frye. Id.
Specifically Daubert allows evidence based upon a novel methodology or technique—evidence
that by definition is not generally accepted—if it proves to be both relevant and reliable. Id. It is
more restrictive in that evidence based on a theory or method that is “generally accepted” will
still be subject to close scrutiny, and upon careful analysis may yet prove to be unreliable
(characterized as something other than good science). Id.
50. Id. at 955 (noting that somebody had to get the radar detector in the courtroom in the
first place).
51. See Craig Lee Montz, Trial Judges as Scientific Gatekeepers After Daubert, Joiner,
Kumho Tire, and Amended Rule 702: Is Anyone Still Seriously Buying This?, 33 UWLA L. REV.
87, 104 (2001).
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only managed to leave the law governing admissibility of expert testimony
unclear.52
1.

The Frye Test

Under Frye, a particular scientific technique does not receive judicial
recognition until it has passed an experimental phase, during which it has been
subject to scrutiny from the relevant scientific community.53 Once a particular
technique is no longer characterized as “novel,” an expert can provide
testimony based on that theory without the Court making an in-depth inquiry
regarding that theory’s acceptance by the relevant scientific community.54
Frye is sometimes lauded by commentators because “general acceptance” acts
as “an independent safeguard for the trustworthiness of scientific testimony.”55
In relation to the “relevancy test” as espoused by some courts, Frye has been
praised because its application is much more practical than a balancing test.56
Furthermore, Frye has been extolled because it affords protection for both
parties in that it restricts the use of questionable experts presenting junk
science.57
Frye is often commended because it is considered a conservative test. It
has been praised because it was “deliberately intended to interpose a
substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new
scientific principles.”58 In the abstract, this is a desirable proposition because
completely unsupported science has no place in the courtroom, especially in
light of the fact that juries often give great weight to expert testimony.59
Though Frye is lauded for its conservative nature, this same conservatism
is a major source of its criticism as well. Frye’s most damning criticism is that
the strictures of its application result in the exclusion of reliable evidence
simply because the evidence has failed to gain the elusive “general acceptance”

52. See Rice, supra note 6, at 61–63. To others, Daubert really is important. These scholars
argue that Daubert has effected a change in the qualification of scientific evidence. See Fenner,
supra note 32.
53. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States,
a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1980) (describing the analysis under Frye
as an “evolutionary process leading to the admissibility of scientific evidence”).
54. Id. at 1205. However, such a result may also be reached under Daubert, whereby a
theory has passed the Daubert test in many courts, and as such another court “may be able to take
judicial notice of the reliability of the general theory and of the particular methodology.” Fenner,
supra note 32, at 1013.
55. Taslitz, supra note 3, at 36. This argument, however, is not very persuasive because
“general acceptance” remains a factor that courts may, and still do, consider.
56. Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1997).
57. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976).
58. Id. at 1245.
59. Id.
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of the scientific community.60 Though a concrete example is lacking, if it were
shown that a novel scientific methodology or principle was unfalteringly
reliable, yet still excluded based on “general acceptance,” this would be strong
evidence militating against the continued use of this test. In this same vein,
Frye has been criticized for its paradoxical effect on different fields of
expertise. One critic has argued that less rigorous fields necessarily reach a
level of “general acceptance” before their more rigorous brethren; accordingly,
the offerings of these less dependable fields will be received more readily than
the offerings of more dependable fields.61 Put another way, this is a criticism
of the ambiguity of the term “general acceptance.” If this criticism is
appropriate, then it seems problematic that the disciplines that subject their
members to the most rigorous scrutiny produce admissible methodologies
much later than those with less scrutiny. If reliability is indeed the goal to be
accomplished by subjecting novel scientific techniques to the “general
acceptance” test, it is illogical that the techniques with lesser assurances of
reliability are “rewarded” with earlier admissibility.62
The Frye test is also criticized for its ambiguity. One such ambiguity is the
undefined period of testing or review that must occur before a method or
technique becomes generally accepted.63 Because there is no precise definition
of “general acceptance,” a technique may produce consistent and reliable
results, yet still not have become “generally accepted” under a particular
judge’s definition. Thus, under this standard, relevant evidence produced as a
result of a reliable novel scientific technique may be excluded for an indefinite
amount of time, thereby denying the trier of fact evidence that may help to
decide a fact at issue.64 Another criticism is that the application of Frye
requires the trial judge to defer admissibility questions to a “nose counting” of
scientists rather than allowing the judge or jury to directly confront the issue of
the reliability of the evidence.65 This “nose count” problem is another
reflection of the ambiguous nature of Frye, because it again reflects the
ambiguity that accompanies the determination of whether a methodology is
generally accepted.
Another problem with Frye is that courts have had a difficult time in
defining what exactly constitutes testimony based upon a novel scientific
technique.66 This difficulty is similar to the difficulty some courts experience
when determining which community is the relevant community for purposes of
60. Taslitz, supra note 3, at 36.
61. Saks, supra note 6, at 231.
62. Characterizing admissibility as a “reward” is probably incorrect because many, if not
most, scientists work without considering the effects of their methods on the judicial system.
63. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 330 (Cal. 1994).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 329.
66. Taslitz, supra note 3, at 36.
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determining “general acceptance.”67 The choice of the relevant community
can very well be outcome-determinative because a technique that is
questionable to mainstream practitioners may be the gold standard for a subset
of practitioners who argue the merits of their methodology.68
Frye is also criticized for its lack of clarity as to whether the “generally
accepted” language applies to principles only, or to techniques applying those
principles as well.69 One court has criticized Frye because its “requirement of
‘general acceptance’ is tantamount to a requirement that the validity of the test
be susceptible of such demonstration as to enable the trial court to take judicial
notice of the fact.”70 This court was skeptical as to whether a responsible test
for the admissibility of scientific evidence would “require the instant and
unquestionable demonstration required for the judicial notice of scientific
facts.”71 Though Frye has many detractors, it still carries significant weight in
many states, and there is little indication that Daubert is any less problematic
than Frye.
2.

The Daubert Test

Daubert is probably most criticized for assigning the trial judge the
responsibility for determining the reliability of scientific methodologies and
principles. This criticism stems from the oft-recited fact that Daubert and
Kumho arguably “assign[ed] the responsibility for screening” offered expert
testimony to those who “have no particular expertise for conducting those
evaluations.”72 This criticism is not reserved to a trial judge’s lack of scientific
knowledge but also her lack of exposure to other technical knowledge as
well.73 Daubert is also criticized because its framework can, and oftentimes is,
applied too rigidly, resulting in the exclusion of otherwise meritorious claims,
unsupportable without the excluded scientific evidence.74
Daubert’s criticisms are more sweeping as well. It is sometimes argued
that this case failed in its essential purpose of encouraging a more liberal
67. Id.
68. See e.g., State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146
(Mo. 2003) (en banc).
69. Taslitz, supra note 3, at 36.
70. State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 979 (La. 1979).
71. Id.
72. Saks, supra note 6, at 230.
73. It is unclear whether the reliability determination is more difficult in regard to expert
scientific testimony than it is for technical or other experience-based testimony. However, given
the flexible nature of the inquiry it would seem that the judge would be able to conduct inquiries
into such testimony the same way that they do in cases involving scientific evidence. Further, it
would seem that all things being equal, a judge’s lack of exposure would render him equally
capable of judging the reliability of a method or principle derived from a technical or experiencebased perspective.
74. See Owen, supra note 2, at 372.
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approach toward the admissibility of evidence; that it in fact accomplished the
opposite—effectively restricting the admissibility of evidence further than
Frye.75 Though it is certainly the case that some courts have applied Daubert
with more rigidity than was intended, the Supreme Court clearly held that the
inquiry should be a flexible one. The source of rigidity in the application of
the Court’s decision can only be attributed to a finite number of causes. Either
the judge has misinterpreted the Court’s opinion, is unable to formulate her
own gauges for reliability, is not willing to undertake an inquiry outside the
explicit dictates of the case, or simply that indicators of reliability are
unavailable concerning certain kinds of information.
Daubert is also criticized for its ill-founded and narrow conception of
science. For example, Professor Crump argues that the Daubert framework for
reliability fails to give adequate consideration to the relationship between
“communicational tractability and empirical validity.”76 Essentially, Crump
argues that a small sacrifice in “empirical validity,” that is, simplifying some
concept or notion into a model or map, can greatly benefit a jury’s
understanding of a particular issue, with only a small and irrelevant sacrifice in
the validity of what is being communicated.77 Fundamentally, Crump argues
that the Court should have used the standard of “appropriate validation,” as
espoused by Professor Imwinkelried,78 and never ventured into the dicta of the
four-factor test.79
Some have argued that Daubert’s conception of reliability is too
amorphous and that its definition is not clear.80 As such, they argue the lower
courts are left without meaningful guidance in the application of the law.81
One federal judge complained that “[t]he very characterization of scientific
knowledge as the ultimate question of admissibility” is problematic in that it
leads judges to undertake “‘independent validation of the expert’s
methodology,’ pretending to scientific expertise and objectivity.”82 This
argument concludes with the observation that the current standard leads some
judges to decide cases in contravention of the Seventh Amendment and the
Federal Rules of Evidence.83 At the heart of these arguments is the belief that

75. Michael H. Graham, The Daubert Dilemma: At Last a Viable Solution?, 179 F.R.D. 1, 3
(1998).
76. Crump, supra note 42, at 35.
77. Id.
78. See Imwinkelried, supra note 42.
79. Crump, supra note 42 (providing a more in-depth analysis of Daubert and its treatment
of modern science).
80. Reavley & Petalas, supra note 28, at 510–11.
81. Id. at 510.
82. Id. at 511 (footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 512 (claiming that the current analysis causes some judges to “undertake to
determine complex scientific issues by caprice”).
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lay judges are not qualified to resolve the issues brought before them in
Daubert cases—or at least those dealing with evidence produced by a novel
scientific technique.
III. DAUBERT AND FRYE—A BATTLE FOR THE STATES
Most of the states have been confronted with the same problem the
Supreme Court faced when it decided Daubert. This problem arises because of
the apparent contradiction between the statute or code provision governing the
admissibility of expert testimony and the “general acceptance” standard of
Frye. At one time, most of the states had adopted a provision similar to Rule
702 and yet continued to apply Frye. Some of these states discontinued their
adherence to Frye and adopted Daubert. However, some that chose to
overrule Frye did not feel compelled to adopt the Supreme Court’s
formulation. Instead, these states constructed admissibility standards
independent from both Frye and Daubert.
A third option emerged as well. A significant number of states reconciled
the general acceptance test enunciated in Frye with their respective rules
governing expert testimony. The most interesting group of states is composed
of those that chose to formulate their own standards for admissibility.
Missouri, Wisconsin, and Delaware are three states that have developed
alternative tests.
A.

Independent Formulations for Determining Admissibility
1.

Missouri: “Forget Frye. Forget Daubert. Read the statute.”84

Until recently, the applicable standard for the qualification of expert
testimony in Missouri was unclear. The Supreme Court of Missouri adopted
the Frye test for civil suits in Alsbach v. Bader.85 This decision, eight years
before Daubert, was unremarkable when it came down. However, the
continued efficacy of this standard became questionable when Missouri
adopted a statutory provision similar to Rule 702.86 Surprisingly, or perhaps
84. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146, 160 (Mo.
2003) (Wolff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. 700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
86. MO. REV. STAT. § 490.065 (1989). This statutory provision was adopted in 1989; it
provides:
1. In any civil action, if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
2. Testimony by such an expert witness in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the
trier of fact.
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not, Frye remained the standard in Missouri despite the absence of any
mention of Frye or “general acceptance” in the statute.
The first arguments in support of a Daubert-like interpretation of section
490.065 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (Missouri’s statutory provision
governing the admissibility of expert testimony) came to the Missouri Supreme
Court in Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital.87 However, as what
eventually became a recurring trend, the Court skirted the issue and held that
“it would be inappropriate . . . to decide in [Callahan] whether section
490.065, RSMo Supp.1992, supersedes the Frye doctrine in the same manner
that Daubert held that Federal Rule 702 changes the requirements for the
admissibility of expert testimony in federal court.”88 In 1997, the Court
decided Lasky v. Union Electric Company, and attempted to clarify the issue
by holding that section 490.065 should govern the admissibility of expert
evidence.89 Though the Court directed the lower court to apply section
490.065 on remand, it did not provide any analysis or guidelines for the
application of the statute.90 If the Court truly intended to settle the debate
between Daubert and Frye in Lasky, it failed to do so. Neither Daubert nor
Frye was mentioned in the Court’s opinion, despite the fact that Frye had been
the avowed standard in Missouri for at least twelve years.91
In State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, the
Supreme Court of Missouri confirmed that section 490.065 should govern the
determination of the admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases.92 This
case involved a disciplinary complaint filed by the State Board of Registration
for the Healing Arts (“the Board”) against Edward McDonagh, D.O., for his
use of chelation therapy in the treatment of vascular disease.93 The
Administrative Hearing Commission (“AHC”) found no cause to discipline Dr.
McDonagh, and the circuit court affirmed.94 On appeal, the Board claimed that

3. The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing and
must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject and must be otherwise reasonably reliable.
4. If a reasonable foundation is laid, an expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference
and give the reasons therefor without the use of hypothetical questions, unless the court
believes the use of a hypothetical question will make the expert’s opinion more
understandable or of greater assistance to the jury due to the particular facts of the case.
Id.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
Id. at 860.
936 S.W.2d 797, 801 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
Id.
See id.
123 S.W.3d 146, 149 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) [hereinafter McDonagh].
Id. at 148–49.
Id. at 149.
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the AHC erroneously failed to apply Frye in evaluating the testimony of Dr.
McDonagh’s experts.95 The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and
remanded with a direction to apply section 490.065 on reconsideration.96
According to the Court in McDonagh, Lasky should have been interpreted
as a directive mandating that section 490.065 superseded Frye, and the statute,
not Frye, was to control.97 To resolve any ambiguities, the Court held that any
cases applying Frye or any other standard (i.e. Daubert) were no longer to be
followed.98 Under the new standard promulgated by the Court in McDonagh,
for expert testimony to be admissible, the facts or data relied on by an expert
“must be those reasonably relied on by experts in the relevant field.”99
Cognizant of the fact that few cases had interpreted section 490.065, the Court
held that those cases (including Daubert) which interpret Rule 702 “provide
relevant and useful guidance in interpreting and applying section 490.065.”100
However, the Court held that when the provisions of section 490.065 differ
with those in Rule 702, the Missouri statute governs.101
As the Court pointed out, a key difference between section 490.065 and
Rule 702 is section (3) of 490.065. This section provides that facts and data
that serve as the basis of an expert’s opinion “must be of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject.”102 As such, there is an explicit reliability requirement in the statute
that must be evaluated by the court. As the Court explained, this is the key
difference between section 490.065 and Rule 702 as interpreted in Daubert
because “in the federal courts an expert need not necessarily identify the
relevant scientific community, or field, in which the data and facts are
accepted.”103 This difference was important to the Court’s analysis because
this determination was dispositive in the case.104
The difference between section 490.065 and Rules 702 and 703 is
significant. In McDonagh, the Court explained that the provision in 703,
which is identical to section 490.065(3), is only relevant as an independent
requirement of admissibility and not as a prerequisite to the admissibility of
expert evidence.105 In contrast, an expert in Missouri must identify the

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d at 153.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 155 (citation omitted).
Id.
McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d at 156 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 490.065(3) (1989)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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community of experts that have accepted the facts at issue.106 This difference
may not seem extremely important, but the Missouri Supreme Court’s
interpretation of this language is different from the standard interpretation of
Rule 703. The provision in Rule 703 that provides, “of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject” is meant to overcome a hearsay objection if an expert
testifies to facts that are not in the record.107 In Rule 703, this provision is not
seen as a factor going to the reliability of an expert’s opinion; however, in
Missouri, this is the interpretation given by the Court. In McDonagh, the
Court explained that section 490.063(3) “expressly requires a showing that the
facts and data are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject of the expert’s testimony.”108
In determining the relevant community, Dr. McDonagh argued that it
should be those practitioners who utilize chelation therapy.109 However, as the
Court points out, this would be a foolhardy inquiry because this community
would consist only of those who chose to practice this therapy in the first
place; thus, they would necessarily testify that this methodology is of a type
reasonably relied on by experts in the field (i.e., them).110 Instead, the Court
determined that the relevant community should be those who treat patients
with vascular disease, so the facts upon which Dr. McDonagh’s experts relied
“must be those perceived by them at trial or must be of a type reasonably relied
on by doctors treating vascular disease.”111 The Court was adamant that it was
not simply adopting Frye under another name, and it asserted that, as under
Daubert, general acceptance is only one factor to be considered in determining
the reliability of a method or technique.112
The practical effect of the Court’s ruling is unclear. Although the Court
professes that Frye is not the standard in Missouri, it is difficult to see the
distinction. At first, it seems that the Court created a test that combines
Daubert and Frye. However, when analyzed more carefully, any interpretation
by the Supreme Court of the United States falls out of the equation. Under the
Missouri formulation, the testimony of an expert must be based on facts and
data of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. This decision, in
effect, makes general acceptance by the relevant scientific community a
threshold consideration for the admissibility of expert testimony. If an expert’s
methods are not accepted by the relevant community, then no further inquiry is
106. Id.
107. See generally 29A AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 1051 (2004); see also 31A AM. JUR. 2D
Expert and Opinion Evidence § 171 (2004).
108. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d at 156.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 157.
112. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d at 156.
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necessary, and the testimony is inadmissible. However, if the facts and data
are generally accepted, the testimony must still be found to be both relevant
and reliable under the Daubert analysis. This formulation is inherently
contradictory. If general acceptance is now a threshold requirement for expert
testimony, analyzing the testimony any further would be superfluous.113
Although it seems that Daubert’s factors would provide additional aid in a
court’s reliability determination, it is the rare case indeed where an expert’s
theory is generally accepted yet unreliable.
2.

Virginia

Virginia has adopted its own standard for determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence.114 This test was set out in Spencer v. Commonwealth. In
Spencer, the court was faced with the proffer of DNA evidence derived from a
process known as PCR DNA amplification.115 Defendant/Appellant claimed
that this process was neither reliable nor generally accepted by the scientific
community.116 The Commonwealth called two expert witnesses who testified
that PCR DNA amplification was scientifically reliable.117 In finding this
evidence admissible, the court provided a detailed analysis of the test that
Virginia courts have adopted.118
In Virginia, when expert scientific testimony is proffered, it is the
responsibility of the court to make a threshold finding of fact regarding the
reliability of the underlying method or technique.119 This finding must be
made unless the technique is “so familiar and accepted as to require no
foundation” to establish the reliability of the technique, e.g., fingerprint
analysis; or “unless it is so unreliable that the considerations requiring its
exclusion have ripened into rules of law,” e.g., lie detector tests; or unless the
admission of the evidence is governed by statute, e.g., blood alcohol test
results.120 The court stressed that the determination regarding the reliability of
an offered scientific method is discretionary.121 Within its discretion, a court
usually relies on the testimony of an expert, and its decision on reliability,
though contested, will not be overturned if its finding is supported by credible

113. See id. at 156–57.
114. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (Va. 1990).
115. Id. at 620. In this case, the more recognized process of DNA printing was not available
to the state because the seminal fluid samples were too degraded for that technique. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. The Court noted that PCR DNA amplification had been widely used in molecular
biology since 1985 but that its application in forensic science was relatively new. Id.
118. Id. passim.
119. Spencer, 393 S.E.2d at 621.
120. Id. (citations omitted).
121. Id.
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evidence.122 Further, when the reliability of a technique or method is disputed,
the court may submit the evidence to a jury—along with instructions to the
jury to take into account the disputed reliability when determining the weight
and credibility of the witness—provided “there is a sufficient foundation to
warrant [its] admission.”123
Under Virginia’s system, responsibility falls on the court to filter out
evidence that is inherently unreliable. Other than those methodologies that are
plainly faulty or so established as to be beyond reproach, Virginia courts have
decided that it should be the jury’s job to resolve contested issues of reliability.
This delegation of responsibility to the jury is quite different from what is done
in the federal courts and in most other states. As did those states that have
adopted Daubert, the Spencer court recognized the importance of leaving
admissibility questions to the discretion of the trial court.124 In light of the
wide discretion afforded trial courts in their determinations of reliability, and
the fact that the PCR DNA amplification was not a method so inherently
unreliable as requiring that it be shielded from the jury, the court did not
disturb the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence.125
3.

Wisconsin

Wisconsin, like Missouri and Virginia, has chosen not to follow Frye or
Daubert. Wisconsin rejected Frye earlier than most states, which may be a
contributing factor to its decision to adopt neither Frye nor Daubert. In
Watson v. State, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was critical of Frye and
adopted a passage from McCormick finding general acceptance “a proper
condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the
admissibility of scientific evidence.”126 The court held that the proper
challenge to such evidence should be through cross-examination or
impeachment evidence.127 So long as an expert is qualified, her testimony can
be submitted to the jury, and questions relating to the reliability of the
proposed expert’s methodology are left for the jury to decide on the grounds of
weight and credibility.128
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin clarified its decision in Watson with its
explanation of the admissibility requirements of scientific evidence in State v.
Walstad.129 In Walstad, the court explicitly held that Frye was rejected in
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Spencer, 393 S.E.2d at 621.
Id.
Watson v. State, 219 N.W.2d 398, 403 (Wis. 1974) (quoting MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 203, at 491 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 351 N.W.2d 469 (Wis. 1984).
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Wisconsin. The court’s repetition of this proposition of law was necessary
because the lower courts in the state continued to apply Frye.130 At the outset,
the court held that Frye was incompatible with the statutes governing
admissibility in Wisconsin, and “is alien to the Wisconsin law of evidence.”131
Reaffirming its holding in Watson, the court held that evidence given by a
qualified expert is “admissible irrespective of the underlying theory on which
Thus in Wisconsin, the most critical
the testimony was based.”132
determination relating to admissibility is the qualification of the expert;
consequently, if the testimony is relevant, it can only be attacked through
impeachment and credibility.133 Essentially, the test for the admissibility of
expert testimony in Wisconsin consists of three parts. First, the evidence must
be relevant; second, the witness must be qualified as an expert; and third, the
evidence must assist the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue.134
Clearly, Wisconsin puts more faith in the jury than any other state. In
federal courts, the trial judge is the gatekeeper; it is her responsibility to
evaluate the evidence and determine if it is reliable. In those states that
continue to follow Frye, the judge, in effect, defers to an expert in the field
who testifies as to whether the theory is generally accepted by the relevant
community of scientists. In Wisconsin, so long as an expert is qualified, it is
the responsibility of the jurors to evaluate the testimony given by that expert.
Then, after hearing the cross-examination of the expert, the jurors should
compare the testimony on direct examination with that elicited on crossexamination (and the testimony of other witnesses) and determine the
reliability of a particular methodology through their determination of the
weight and credibility to be given the witness.
4.

Independent Tests for Determining Admissibility: Misplaced
Confidence or a Step in the Right Direction?

It is too soon to determine the effect of the Missouri Supreme Court’s
opinion in McDonagh. However, to the extent that that court relies on the
plain meaning of its evidentiary statute to guide admissibility determinations
on scientific evidence, litigants are left with painfully little to go on. Instead of
providing some coherent mechanism to guide litigants in Missouri courts, the
Supreme Court has left only a confused amalgam that begs for revision.
Virginia and Wisconsin have developed tests that are remarkably
dissimilar to both Frye and Daubert. The tests in place in both of these States
130. See id. at 485; see, e.g., State v. Bohner, 246 N.W. 314 (Wis. 1933); State v.
Stanislawski, 216 N.W.2d 8 (Wis. 1974); State v. Dean, 307 N.W.2d 628 (Wis. 1981); State v.
Armstrong, 329 N.W.2d 386 (Wis. 1983).
131. Walstad, 351 N.W.2d at 486.
132. Id. at 487.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 486.
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reflect either an unparalleled respect for the abilities of juries or a pragmatic
solution to a difficult problem. Virginia allows an expert to testify before the
jury even if the reliability of a method or principle upon which he bases his
testimony is disputed, so long as there is a sufficient foundation to warrant
admission. In effect, the test in Virginia allows for evidence based on
extremely reliable and extremely unreliable science to be handled in a
summary fashion. However, at the margins, Virginia courts allow evidence to
reach the jury, even if it is not based on “generally accepted” methodologies or
lacks some hallmarks of reliability. This approach gives judges the discretion
to allow an expert to testify based upon disputed science, where in other
jurisdictions the judge may have been forced to, in effect, pick a side and
exclude evidence that could be potentially reliable. In Virginia, this potential
is assessed by the jury, who, after having heard the testimony and crossexamination, make the determination. Similarly, Wisconsin courts have put
the ultimate reliability determination in the hands of the jury by allowing an
expert to testify so long as she has been qualified by the court. Again, like
Virginia, the reliability of testimony based on arguable science is a matter for
the jury to decide after observing cross-examination.
In those states that continue to follow Frye, it is argued that a conservative
test is absolutely necessary when dealing with scientific evidence. These
courts adopt and embrace the notion that judges, and a fortiori jurors, do not
have the education or experience to decide disputes concerning the reliability
of scientific principles and methodology. Under Daubert, it is clear that as a
gatekeeper, it is the responsibility of the judge, not the jury, to determine
whether scientific evidence is reliable and relevant. By contrast, courts in
Wisconsin and Virginia are confident that an adequate resolution to disputed
reliability can be gained through a jury’s evaluation of the weight and
credibility of expert witnesses. It is unclear whether the Virginia and
Wisconsin tests rest on the assumption that lay jurors possess the faculties to
come to meaningful determinations on scientific reliability. It may be that the
courts in these states have determined it is unwise to restrict the jury from
hearing testimony, the reliability of which the judge himself cannot determine,
where they can hear the testimony and make the determination themselves.
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States that Continue to Follow Frye
1.

California

California continues to adhere to a modified version of the Frye test.135
California’s current test for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence is the
Kelly/Frye test.136 In Kelly, the Court set forth three general considerations
that should guide the admissibility determination regarding evidence based on
a novel scientific technique. First, “the reliability of the method must be
established, usually by expert testimony,” second, “the witness furnishing such
testimony must be properly qualified as an expert to give an opinion on the
subject,” and third, “the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate that
correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case.”137 In
conjunction with the aforementioned general principles of admissibility, the
Court adopted the “general acceptance” test as set out in Frye.138 The Court’s
primary justification for the adoption of Frye was the fact that Frye is a
conservative test.139 The Court wanted to ensure that evidence based on new
scientific techniques was subject to a strict test because of the possibility that
jurors could be easily swayed by the “misleading aura of certainty which often
envelops a new scientific process, obscuring its currently experimental
nature.”140
As was the case in most other states, Daubert brought into question the
continued merit of using a test based on Frye.141 One court in California,
recognizing that “the Frye half of the Kelly/Frye rule may . . . no longer exist,”
persisted in applying the rule (and using the name) because Kelly was a

135. See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, (Cal. 1976) (noting that California Courts have
expressly adopted the Frye test) overruled on other grounds by People v. Wilkinson, 94 P.3d 551
(Cal. 2004). The Court in Kelly lauded Frye because it “assures that those most qualified to
assess the general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice.” Kelly, 549
P.2d at 1244 (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743–44 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). Further
praise of this standard was given because it applies equally to both prosecution and defense and it
is likely to produce consistent and uniform decisions. Id.
136. See People v. Reilly, 242 Cal. Rptr. 496, 500 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
137. Kelly, 549 P.2d at 1244.
138. Id. The Court recognized the conservative nature of the Frye test but felt “judicial
caution” was appropriate when dealing with evidence based on new scientific techniques. Id.
The Court firmly rejected the argument that the admission of this evidence should be left to the
discretion of the trial court, noting that this rejection was in accordance with the rationale that
other states had adopted. Id.
139. Id. at 1245.
140. Id. (quoting Huntingdon v. Crowley, 414 P.2d 382, 390 (Cal. 1966)). The Court’s
dedication to a conservative approach may also be accounted for by an increased need for caution
in criminal cases. See id.
141. See People v. Wash, 861 P.2d 1107, 1123 n.9 (Cal. 1993).
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decision that construed the California Evidence Code.142 One year after the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Daubert, the Supreme Court of
California held in People v. Leahy that “Daubert affords no compelling reason
for abandoning Kelly.”143 In Leahy, the Court acknowledged that sections 720
and 801 of the California Evidence Code are the functional equivalent of Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.144 As in Rule 702, the statutory
language in the California Evidence Code does not contain any specific
reference to Frye’s “general acceptance” standard, nor does the drafting history
of the California Evidence Code establish any intent to incorporate such a
standard.145 In Leahy, the court found the fact that Kelly was decided eleven
years after the adoption of the California Evidence Code in 1965 persuasive.146
Furthermore, because Kelly was rendered after the Code was adopted, the court
found the rationale in Daubert unpersuasive.147 After conducting a costbenefit analysis of Kelly/Frye’s continued place in California law, the court
was convinced that the standard was appropriate.148
Implicit in the logic supporting the continued efficacy of the Kelly/Frye
test is the notion that lay judges are not qualified to gauge whether a particular
scientific technique is accorded general acceptance.149 This view is in stark
contrast to that expressed by the majority in Daubert, which argued that federal
142. In re Aontae D., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 179 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
143. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 324 (Cal. 1994).
144. Id. at 327. As quoted in the Court’s opinion:
Section 720, subdivision (a) provides that “A person is qualified to testify as an expert if
he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify
him as an expert on the subject to which the his testimony relates. . . .” Subdivision (b) of
that section provides that “A witness’ special knowledge . . . may be shown by any
otherwise admissible evidence, including his own testimony.”
Section 801 permits an expert to state an opinion that is “(a) Related to a subject that
is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the
trier of fact; and (b) Based on matter (including his special knowledge . . .) perceived by
or personally known to the witness . . ., whether or not admissible, that is of a type that
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to
which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter
as a basis for his opinion.”
Id.
145. Though there is no statutory language that directly incorporates a “general acceptance”
standard, the court in Leahy notes that the language is “of a type that reasonably may be relied
upon by an expert,” and may be broad enough to incorporate such a standard. Id. at 327–28.
146. Id. at 328 (noting that the court in Kelly was presumably aware of Frye’s absence from
the Code and its history, and the fact that the “general acceptance” standard could well have been
interpreted as contradictory with the liberal thrust of the California Evidence Code).
147. Leahy, 882 P.2d at 331. The court also found the fact that although many amendments
had been made to the expert testimony provisions of the California Evidence Code, the lack of
any change to 720 and 801 is evidence of legislated adoption of the standard. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 325.
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judges possess the capability to ascertain the validity of a particular scientific
method or technique.150 One is left to wonder whether this contradiction
results from a supposed disparity between the respective abilities of members
of the state and federal judiciaries, or whether it is merely the result of
differing views on the judge’s role in these proceedings.
In California, the Kelly/Frye test is limited in scope. This test only applies
to the admission of scientific evidence; however, it is not limited to
“‘machines’ or techniques that involve the manipulation of physical
evidence.”151 One justification for drawing a distinction between evidence
derived from a novel scientific technique and that derived from the experience,
technical expertise, or education of a witness is a product of the relative weight
a jury will give to a piece of evidence. It is argued that jurors tend to ascribe
too much credence to evidence produced by a machine;152 whereas, a juror is
more inclined to be skeptical of the opinion of one qualified as an expert,
because though the opinion is from an expert it is from a fallible human just
the same.153
2.

Florida

In Florida, questions of admissibility are governed by the Florida Evidence
Code.154 In spite of, or perhaps, because of this fact, Florida still adheres to a
version of the Frye test. In Hadden v. State, the Florida Supreme Court
reiterated its commitment to Frye by holding that novel scientific evidence is
not admissible unless it meets the Frye test.155 The Court then addressed the
effect that the adoption of the Florida Evidence Code had on the continued
efficacy of the Frye test.156 The Hadden Court argued, inter alia, that “a
courtroom is not a laboratory, and as such it is not the place to conduct
scientific experiments. If the scientific community considers a procedure or

150. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
151. People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698, 717 (Cal. 1989). The court noted that “[t]estimony based
on a new scientific process ‘operating on purely psychological evidence’ would be subject to the
Kelly/Frye test. Id.
152. See Wilson v. Phillips, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204, 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
153. See id.
154. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.702 (West 2004) (treating expert testimony substantially
similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 702). Neither this provision, nor the notes accompanying it,
make any reference to Frye or “general acceptance.” Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla.
1997).
155. Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 581.
156. Id. at 577. The court was mindful of the arguments made by litigators and the holdings
of some district courts concerning the absence of mention to Frye in the newly adopted Code. Id.
These lower district courts applied a simple relevancy standard to proffered scientific evidence.
Id. See also Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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process unreliable for its own purposes, then the procedure must be considered
less reliable for courtroom use.”157
The court found that its “prior allegiance” to Frye after the enactment of
the Florida Evidence Code “manifest[ed its] intent to use the Frye test . . . even
though the Frye test is not set forth in the evidence code.”158 The court
grounded its decision upon a notion of reliability and implied that using a
standard other than Frye would allow an expert to qualify his own testimony
by his own assertions.159 This argument is a tacit condemnation of both the
relevance standard160 and the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Daubert. At least as far as Florida courts are concerned, Frye is currently the
only method by which the reliability of expert testimony can be assured.161
3.

Adherence to Frye: Is a Conservative Approach Appropriate for
Scientific Evidence?

Florida and California have been steadfast in their support of Frye, though
both states have evidence codes with rules similar to Rule 702. Where the
Supreme Court found Frye and “general acceptance” to be incompatible with
the federal rules, Florida and California found compatibility with their
evidence codes. The reasons for these fundamentally dissimilar interpretations
of relatively similar statutory provisions cannot be attributed to vagaries in
statutory interpretation. The courts in Florida and California have decided to
keep Frye as the standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence and have
interpreted their code provisions accordingly. This is not to say, however, that
Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire reflect a natural or inevitable reading of Rule
702. It is safe to say that the majority in Daubert, at least to some extent,
tailored their reading of Rule 702 to reach their desired ends as well.
The primary motivation for this continued adherence to Frye seems to be a
belief in the absolute need for a conservative test. The Supreme Courts of both
California and Florida have repeatedly lauded Frye’s conservative nature. It is
this conservatism, this need to leave the determination of reliability solely in
the hands of the scientists that is the hallmark of the qualification issue in these
states. Implicit in this stance is the notion that judges and juries should not

157. Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 577–78 (quoting State v. Stokes, 548 So. 2d 188, 193–94 (Fla.
1989)).
158. Id. at 578.
159. Id. (arguing that to use anything other than Frye “would permit resolutions based upon
evidence which has not been demonstrated to be sufficiently reliable and would thereby cast
doubt on the reliability of the factual resolutions”).
160. For an explanation of this standard, see Giannelli, supra note 53, at 1205.
161. See Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993). Florida courts have consciously
chosen to restrict Frye’s “rigid” qualification regimen to novel scientific evidence. Id.
Accordingly, all other kinds of expert testimony are not subject to the strictures that often
accompany application of Frye. Id.
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undertake the reliability determination. It does not necessarily follow that the
law in these states reflects the notion that judges and juries are incapable of
coherently determining the reliability of a scientific methodology or principle,
but rather, it is fairly implied. This implication produces the fundamental and
determinative question: Are judges and juries capable of ascertaining the
reliability of a scientific methodology or principle? If they are, then Frye and
its “general acceptance” test are anachronistic and should be extricated from
the books in every state that continues to apply Frye. If a judge is capable of
coming to a determination that testimony based on novel science is both
relevant and reliable and not unduly prejudicial, then this determination should
be respected without regard to whether the science is generally accepted.
Conversely, if a judge and jury are incapable of producing coherent
determinations on the reliability of a scientific methodology or principle, then
Frye and general acceptance are the pragmatic solution to a complicated
problem. Although the “general acceptance” test is admittedly conservative
and would exclude some reliable and relevant evidence, this would be an
acceptable loss when compared to the alternative—inconsistent and
contradictory admissibility determinations resulting in the admission of
evidence based on shoddy science or the needless restriction of reliable and
relevant evidence.
C. States That Have Adopted the Daubert Formulation
1.

Iowa

Iowa has an evidence code modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and as such, has adopted a rule equivalent to Rule 702.162 As early as 1981,
the Supreme Court of Iowa held that Frye was not a prerequisite to the
admission of scientific evidence and that Frye need not be applied if reliability
could be ascertained in another manner.163 In Hall, the court found Frye
incompatible with evidence law as promulgated in the Federal Rules of
Evidence and incompatible with the liberal trend in evidence law in Iowa.164
In 1994, the court decided Hutchison v. American Family Mutual
Insurance Co.165 The court refused to apply restrictions on expert testimony
that were not found in Iowa Rule of Evidence 702, or in Daubert.166
162. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 5.702 (West 2004). Commenting on the nature of this rule, the
Supreme Court of Iowa noted that the adoption of this rule was in accordance with the liberal
stance that Iowa courts had taken regarding opinion testimony. Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Iowa 1994).
163. State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 85 (Iowa 1980).
164. Id.
165. 514 N.W.2d at 882.
166. Id. at 887. Specifically, the court refused to interpret Rule 702 as requiring that a
potential expert “belong[] to a particular profession or ha[ve] a particular degree.” Id. at 887–88.
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Furthermore, the Iowa court found the Supreme Court’s stance in Daubert—in
favor of a discretionary role for the trial judge in determining admissibility—to
be more effective than the more fixed and confined position of a judge
operating under the framework of Frye.167
Following the lead of the majority in Daubert, the Supreme Court of Iowa
expressed its belief that judges in Iowa were capable of exercising their
discretion in the adjudication of these matters.168 The court’s previous official
displeasure with Frye and liberal construction of its own evidence law made
Iowa a natural for the adoption of the Daubert standard; the state took less than
a year to recognize the Daubert test as the appropriate standard to govern in
Iowa.
2.

Texas

Like Iowa, Texas has adopted a Daubert-like standard governing the
admissibility of scientific evidence. In E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company,
Inc. v. Robinson, the Supreme Court of Texas found that in order for an
expert’s testimony to be admitted, it must be relevant to an issue in the case
and it must be based on a reliable foundation.169 The court referenced a
problem thought to be pervasive in the realm of expert testimony; namely, that
a party can usually find an expert to deliver an opinion in support of its theory
of the case “regardless of its merit.”170
Relying on Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Procedure and an
opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals,171 the Robinson court was
persuaded that the Daubert test was the appropriate standard for Texas. In
addition to the illustrative factors in Daubert, the court found that an analysis
of the “extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation
of the expert,” is relevant to the trial court’s initial determination of
admissibility.172 Although this requirement may be implicit in a thoughtful
167. Id. at 888.
168. Id.
169. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. 1995).
170. Id. at 553. This proposition is troubling on many levels. If this is the reality of the
situation, then both experts and attorneys may be shirking their ethical responsibilities in their
respective professions.
171. Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). In Robinson, the Texas
Supreme Court adopted the nonexhaustive list of factors set forth in Kelly that should be
considered in a determination of reliability. The list includes: “(1) general acceptance of the
theory and technique by the relevant scientific community; (2) the experts qualifications; (3) the
existence of literature supporting or rejecting the theory; (4) the technique’s potential rate of
error; (5) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (6) the clarity with
which the theory or technique can be explained to the trial court; and (7) the experience and skill
of the person who applied the technique on the occasion in question.” Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at
556 (citation omitted).
172. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557.
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analysis of other Daubert factors, this is a significant addition because it may
alleviate some measure of a court’s incredulity regarding a well-credentialed
expert.
In Robinson, the court also disregarded the dissent’s claim that adopting
Daubert would force a judge to assume the role of an amateur scientist.173 The
court was convinced that one need not be a scientist to evaluate the reliability
of a scientific technique and felt that judges were capable of undertaking the
Further, the court rejected the argument that Daubert was
task.174
unconstitutional because the judge’s function as gatekeeper usurped the jury’s
role in determining the weight and credibility of witnesses.175 Dismissing this
argument, the court cited the difference between the reliability of a theory and
the credibility of a witness.176
In Robinson, the court was cognizant of the problem of calling on the jury
to be the arbiter of complex scientific questions that not even scientists can
agree on.177 It also took into account the difficulty juries have in evaluating
expert evidence, noting that “it can be both powerful and misleading.”178 In
light of the potential for the misuse or overly influential character of expert
scientific testimony, Texas law mandates a higher responsibility for its judges
to “ensure that expert testimony show some indicia of reliability.”179
3.

Delaware

Delaware is another state that has rejected the Frye test in favor of a test
akin to Daubert. In Nelson v. State, the Supreme Court of Delaware addressed
the admissibility of DNA typing in criminal prosecutions.180 At trial, the
prosecution introduced the results of a DNA test of the defendant’s blood,
which showed that the defendant’s DNA matched the DNA taken from semen
found on the victim.181 On appeal, the defendant claimed the results of the
DNA tests were inadmissible under Frye because the test was “still emerging”
and because there were several deficiencies in the test.182 Since the adoption
of the Delaware Rules of Evidence in 1980—modeled on the Federal Rules of
Evidence—courts in Delaware have consistently held that Frye’s “general

173. Id.
174. Id. at 557–58. The court went on to suggest that a judge may be more capable of
assessing this kind of question than a jury—citing the judge’s ability to review documents and
briefs while juries must depend on oral testimony. Id. at 558.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 553.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 628 A.2d 69, 70 (Del. 1993).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 72.
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acceptance” test is not the only measure for determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence.183 The court found that the trial court’s failure to apply
Frye was not error.184 In making this determination, the court held that the
admission of scientific evidence was to be governed by the relevant provisions
of the Delaware Rules of Evidence, and as such, if evidence was to be
admitted, the trial court must find the evidence relevant and reliable.185 With
this framework for determining admissibility, the Nelson court held that the
DNA typing evidence was inadmissible because the evidence should have been
presented in conjunction with a statistical interpretation of the match.186
Because the Delaware Rules and Federal Rules are so similar, the Supreme
Court of Delaware follows the interpretation of Rule 702 handed down by the
Supreme Court of the United States.187 Accordingly, Delaware’s highest court
has adopted the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Daubert and Carmichael
holding that the trial court’s gatekeeping obligation applies to all expert
testimony, not just to testimony based on novel science.188
IV. CONCLUSION
Although it has been the subject of much discussion, the question of
whether a judge has the capacity to evaluate the reliability of a scientific
principle or method has not been answered. The question, therefore, is: “What
next?” The Supreme Court of the United States has chosen to invest trial court
judges with the responsibility of determining the reliability of principles and
methodologies underlying proposed scientific testimony.
This is a
discretionary function that the Supreme Court is confident trial judges have the
capacity to undertake. Some states have chosen to continue to apply the Frye
test. These states have determined that the best way to ensure that only reliable
evidence reaches the jury is to mandate that the methodology or principle
underlying an expert’s testimony is generally accepted by the relevant
scientific community. These courts are confident that the scientists themselves
183. Id. at 73; see also Santiago v. State, 510 A.2d 488, 489 (Del. 1986); Whalen v. State, 434
A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1981).
184. Nelson, 628 A.2d at 73.
185. Id. at 74. The court found that the relevancy and reliability requirements were the same
as those set forth in Daubert. Id. In a footnote to the opinion, the court noted that, like the
requirements of Rule 702, the analysis under the Delaware Rules of Evidence must be focused on
the methodologies underlying the proffered evidence and not on the resultant conclusions. Id. at
74 n.6.
186. Id. at 75. At trial, the Superior Court excluded the State’s statistical evidence relating to
the match of the DNA type. Id. The Supreme Court found this exclusion to be an error of law,
and that for DNA matching evidence to be admissible it must be submitted in conjunction with
this statistical interpretation. Id. However, because of the “overwhelming evidence” in support
of the convictions, the court held the error to be harmless. Id. at 70.
187. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 521 (Del. 1999).
188. Id. at 522.
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are those best fit to pass judgment on questions of reliability. This begs the
question, of course, of whether a relevant community of scientists is the only
group capable of making this determination—or if they are capable of making
this determination at all. Finally, there are those states that have chosen to
leave questions of disputed reliability to juries. These courts are confident that
impeachment and cross-examination can adequately resolve questions of
disputed reliability.
Missouri, on the other hand, is a paragon of inconsistency. The situation in
Missouri illustrates why these issues continue to be brought before the high
courts in the states. The Supreme Court of Missouri has addressed this issue
many times and has failed to produce a coherent framework to clarify how the
determination of the admissibility of scientific evidence should be governed.
Although one member of the court has advised that litigators should “Forget
Frye. Forget Daubert [and] [r]ead the statute,”189 it is clear that statutes based
on Rule 702 are not self-executing and are inherently unclear. The Supreme
Court of the United States has interpreted Rule 702 to require a trial judge to
become a gatekeeper and evaluator of scientific methodology, with the
responsibility of determining whether that methodology represents “scientific
knowledge.” Conversely, various state courts have come to another conclusion
altogether. They have determined that “general acceptance” and the provisions
based on Rule 702 are not incompatible. To direct litigators to look to the face
of the statute for clarification on this issue is laughable.
The debate over Daubert and Frye will continue so long as a judge’s
ability to determine the reliability of scientific principles and methodology is
questioned. As soon as enough courts decide that trial judges are capable of
making this determination, Frye should be abandoned. The trend in the states
is in this direction. No rationale can possibly support Frye if judges possess
the capacity to evaluate the reliability of scientific evidence. At least insofar as
judicial economy is concerned, “general acceptance” could still play a role as a
mechanism for expedience. The reliability of a methodology or technique
recognized as generally accepted would not be unquestionable. However, if a
principle were considered generally accepted, perhaps a rebuttable
presumption of reliability in favor of a generally accepted technique should be
created. In effect, if judges can be trusted to determine a technique’s
reliability, then a continued adherence to Frye creates too great a risk that
relevant and reliable evidence will be excluded from the jury.
Although not as restrictive as Frye, Daubert still presents some problems.
If well-credentialed experts genuinely disagree on the reliability of a
methodology or principle, then maybe a judge should not be the one to make
the ultimate determination on reliability. When such genuine disputes arise,
189. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146, 160 (Mo.
2003) (Wolff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the question may become more akin to a determination of weight and
credibility and less similar to other determinations of admissibility. Perhaps
Wisconsin and Virginia have developed a more workable and fair approach to
determinations of fiercely contested reliability. These states allow the jury to
decide which expert to believe; thus, they are not deprived of potentially
reliable evidence. Of course, these formulations could allow unreliable
testimony to reach the jury, but, as always, the jury can choose to disbelieve
this testimony, as this is one of its primary functions in the first place. Along
this same line, the potential for a jury to become overly influenced by the
testimony of an expert can be mitigated in cases where each side presents
testimony of qualified experts that is arguably reliable. Thus, any potential
awe that a jury might experience would be spread across the experts of both
parties.
In Daubert, Justice Blackmun observed that “there are important
differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth
in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision.
Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly.”190 The
law, however, is also subject to revision. When the law ceases to achieve its
purpose, a revision may be necessary. Those states that adopted Daubert
decided that an application of Frye was no longer consistent with their rules
governing admissibility of scientific evidence. Some states determined that
Frye was appropriate, and others determined that neither Daubert nor Frye
were appropriate. So long as judicial capacity to evaluate the reliability of
science is in question, determining the appropriate standard will be difficult.
However, there are other choices available, and with time, one of the choices
may turn out to be the most pragmatic solution to this difficult problem.
CLARK HEDGER



190. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596–97 (1993).
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